The proposed merger of AT&T and T-Mobile: Are there unexhausted scale economies in U.S. mobile telephony? by Li, Yan & Pittman, Russell
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The proposed merger of AT&T and
T-Mobile: Are there unexhausted scale
economies in U.S. mobile telephony?
Yan Li and Russell Pittman
Norwich Business School and Centre for Competition Policy,
University of East Anglia, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, U.K., Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, and New
Economic School, Moscow.
April 2012
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/39043/
MPRA Paper No. 39043, posted 26. May 2012 16:04 UTC
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS GROUP 
DISCUSSION PAPER 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The proposed merger of AT&T and T-Mobile:  Are there unexhausted scale 
economies in U.S. mobile telephony? 
 
 
By 
Yan Li and Russell Pittman  
EAG 12-2    April 2012 
 
 
EAG Discussion Papers are the primary vehicle used to disseminate research from economists in 
the Economic Analysis Group (EAG) of the Antitrust Division.  These papers are intended to 
inform interested individuals and institutions of EAG’s research program and to stimulate 
comment and criticism on economic issues related to antitrust policy and regulation.  The 
Antitrust Division encourages independent research by its economists.  The views expressed 
herein are entirely those of the authors and are not purported to reflect those of the United States 
Department of Justice. 
 
Information on the EAG research program and discussion paper series may be obtained from 
Russell Pittman, Director of Economic Research, Economic Analysis Group, Antitrust Division, 
U.S. Department of Justice, LSB 9004, Washington, DC 20530, or by e-mail at 
russell.pittman@usdoj.gov.  Comments on specific papers may be addressed directly to the 
authors at the same mailing address or at their e-mail address. 
 
Recent EAG Discussion Paper and EAG Competition Advocacy Paper titles are available from 
the Social Science Research Network at www.ssrn.com.  To obtain a complete list of titles or to 
request single copies of individual papers, please write to Kathy Burt at kathy.burt@usdoj.gov or 
call (202) 307-5794.  In addition, recent papers are now available on the Department of Justice 
website at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/eag/discussion-papers.html. 
1 
 
 
 The proposed merger of AT&T and T-Mobile:  Are there unexhausted scale 
economies in U.S. mobile telephony? 
 
By  
 
Yan Li* and Russell Pittman+
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
From the beginning, the debate on the likely results of the proposed acquisition of T-Mobile USA by 
AT&T focused more on the claims of the parties that “immense” merger efficiencies would overwhelm 
any apparent losses of competition than on the presence or absence of those losses, and the factors that 
might affect them, such as market definition.  The companies based their “economic model” of the 
merger on estimates of efficiencies on AT&T’s “engineering model”, without addressing the credibility 
of the results of the latter in the context of the economics literature on the telecommunications sector.  In 
this paper we first argue that the economics literature on economies of scale (especially) and economies 
of density in mobile telephony suggests caution in expecting such massive cost reductions from 
increasing the size of an already very large firm.  We then present new econometric evidence from an 
international data base supporting the notion that most large mobile telephone service providers have 
reached the point of constant or even (rarely) declining returns to scale. 
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1. Introduction 
AT&T’s proposed $39 billion acquisition of T-Mobile USA (TMU) raised serious concerns 
for US policymakers, particularly at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the 
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department (DOJ), which shared jurisdiction over the deal.  
Announced on March 20, 2011, the acquisition would have combined two of the four major 
national providers of mobile telephony services for both individuals and businesses, with the 
combined firm’s post-acquisition share of revenues reportedly over 40 percent, Verizon a strong 
number two at just under 40 percent, and Sprint a distant number three at around 20 percent.1
As usual in a large and complex merger deal, there were questions about how exactly to 
define markets, in both the product and geographic dimensions.  In the former category were the 
questions of both whether prepaid and postpaid services and whether individual and business 
(“enterprise”) services might constitute separate markets; in the latter category it was noted that 
the four major national suppliers competed along some dimensions at both the local and national 
levels, and at the local levels both their shares and the identity of additional competitors varied to 
some degree.  Both DOJ (in its Complaint, filed on August 31, 2011) and the staff of the FCC (in 
its Staff Analysis and Findings, filed on November 29, 2011) argued that the merger would be 
highly concentrating and anticompetitive regardless of the choices made on these more specific 
market definition questions. 
 
An interesting and unusual aspect of the debate that ensued following the announcement of 
the merger, through the issuing of the DOJ complaint and the (negative) FCC staff report, until 
the companies abandoned the merger project on December 19, 2011, was that the merging firms 
did not seem to devote much effort to the presentation of evidence against the market definitions 
that implied these high levels of concentration.  The companies’ principal economic experts, 
Dennis Carlton, Allan Shampine, and Hal Sider (hereinafter CSS), in their Declaration filed at 
the FCC with the merger proposal, stated the basis of their support for the merger in very clear 
terms:  “We conclude that the proposed transaction will promote competition by enabling the 
merged firm to achieve engineering-based network synergies that increase network capacity 
beyond the levels that AT&T and T-Mobile USA could achieve if the two companies continued 
to operate independently.”  (Declaration at ¶7)  The Declaration proceeded to argue that the 
merged firm would continue to face competition from a variety of sources, as well as that the 
standard “unilateral effects” analysis expected to be engaged in by DOJ would be misleading for 
a variety of industry- and situation-specific reasons (Declaration at ¶9), but did not take strong 
                                                 
1 FCC (2010); AAI (2011); Grunes and Stucke (2012).  In its Complaint, DOJ emphasized not market shares but changes in the 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI):  “Nationally, the proposed merger would result in an HHI of more than 3,100 for mobile 
wireless telecommunications services, an increase of nearly 700 points.”  DOJ Complaint, at ¶25. 
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issue with the basic market definition and concentration analysis that it deemed likely flow from 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission.2
In their FCC application and later in more detail at the agencies, the merging companies 
highlighted two categories of efficiencies that would result from the merger.  The first category, 
apparently not quantified in a single summary figure, constituted cost savings that were a 
primary input into the companies’ “engineering model,” which in turn was a primary input into 
the CSS “economic model” of the impact of the merger.  (Both models were in fact introduced 
subsequent to the filing of the merger application and the CSS Declaration.)  These cost savings 
were summarized by the companies as follows: 
  In their Reply 
Declaration (June 9), CSS stated the point even more starkly:  “These consumer benefits are 
independent of the scope of the product and geographic markets and, as a result, the precise 
definitions of the product and geographic markets are not central to the evaluation of the 
proposed transaction” (¶59). 
“[T]he transaction will enable the merged firm to create far greater capacity on the combined 
network than the two networks could achieve on their own by (i) creating a denser network 
with additional cell sites that increase aggregate capacity; (ii) increasing spectrum available 
to provide service by consolidating redundant GSM network control channels; (iii) increasing 
the efficiency of existing spectrum through ‘channel pooling’; (iv) making greater use of 
underutilized networks; and (v) freeing up spectrum for more spectrally efficient services and 
thereby expanding the number of areas in which such services will be deployed.  In so doing, 
the transaction will give the combined company much-needed flexibility to relieve capacity 
constraints by enabling it to optimize its use of spectrum on a market-by-market basis….”  
(Application, at p. 42) 
The second category of efficiencies, estimated in the Application at $39 billion total, “with an 
annual run rate on the order of $3 billion from year three forward,” included more efficient use 
of the cell towers owned by the two companies (including the sale of those no longer needed 
post-merger), as well as economies in combining retail operations, customer support, marketing, 
and procurement, the latter including “handsets as well as network equipment and infrastructure”) 
(Application at pp. 51-52). 
In this paper, we seek to place these very large merger efficiency claims in the context of the 
cost structure of mobile telephony and other network industries.  Section 2 of the paper examines 
more closely the efficiencies claims made by the parties and their implications.  Section 3 
considers these claims in the context of the economic literature on economies of scale and 
                                                 
2 Chang, Evan, and Schmalensee (2011) noted this as well:  “AT&T’s economists do not seem to be in significant disagreement 
with these product and geographic definitions” (i.e., those in the DOJ Complaint). 
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economies of density.  We suggest there that the parties’ claims of efficiencies, while certainly 
not outside the realm of possibility, are remarkably high for a company already as large and with 
as high a market share as AT&T. 
We proceed to present a new set of econometric results on scale economies for 22 mobile 
carriers from seven countries (involving two North-American, three European and two East-
Asian countries) over the time period 1998-2007, using a parametric stochastic frontier approach 
to identify the firms’ economies of scale.  Section 4 of the paper elaborates the methodology, 
including theoretical models and empirical applications.  Section 5 describes the data, and 
Section 6 discusses the empirical results.  Section 7 concludes with policy implications.   
2. The Efficiencies Claimed by the Merging Firms  
As noted above, the public record appears to contain no single dollar figure for the value of 
the efficiencies claimed by the companies in the “engineering model”.  However, the companies’ 
Application at the FCC described them as “immense” (pp. 12 and 23), and the subsequent filing 
by the companies in “Opposition … to Petitions to Deny” (June 10, 2011) promised that the 
merger would create “immense new capacity that will provide enormous benefits to consumers” 
(at 1; emphasis supplied).  We can make more precise inferences concerning the magnitude of 
these claims of efficiencies by combining information from various sources. 
First, the FCC staff report summarizes the companies’ redacted analysis as concluding that 
following the merger, “prices would fall between 3.8 and 9.4 percent” (Staff Analysis at ¶136).  
Second, a redacted letter from AT&T counsel to the FCC, accompanied by a redacted slide 
presentation titled “Competitive Effects of the AT&T – T-Mobile Transaction”, notes that the 
economic model presented by CSS assumes linear demand in order to be on the conservative 
side regarding the pass-through of cost reductions to consumers.  Since standard economic 
theory holds that firms facing linear demand pass through approximately fifty percent of cost 
changes,3
But the same presentation implies that – as usual in merger simulation – the model would 
predict a post-merger price increase if there were no efficiencies:  “Our analysis indicates that 
the cost and quality benefits are more than sufficient to counter any upward pricing pressure...” 
(slide 3, emphasis added).  Similarly, AT&T economist Mark Israel noted in the FCC’s 
“Workshop on the Economics of the Proposed AT&T – T-Mobile Merger” that “what really 
drives the results is the change in the AT&T marginal cost, and whether that’s large enough to 
 this by itself would suggest that the parties are claiming cost reductions of between 7.6 
and 18.8 percent. 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Weyl and Fabinger (2011). 
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overcome the competitive effects” (transcript p. 251; emphasis supplied).  Finally, in their Reply 
Declaration (June 9, 2011), CSS discuss the “Upward Pricing Pressure Analysis” calculated by 
Stephen Salop, Stanley Besen, Stephen Kletter, Serge Moresi, and John Woodbury and 
submitted on May 31 on behalf of Sprint’s challenge to the merger.  CSS report that, after 
making some but not all of their proposed corrections to the Sprint model, the model predicts 
upward pricing pressure “not very far from the threshold that is used at the Antitrust Division in 
determining whether GUPPI levels raise unilateral effects concerns” – by which a footnote 
explains that they mean 5 percent (¶87). 
Thus the efficiencies claimed must reduce the price not from its current level but from its 
higher but-for level – adding a figure “not very far from” 5% into the mix, so perhaps 6-7%.  
Furthermore, the letter and the Application strongly emphasize that the efficiencies included in 
this pricing analysis should be considered an underestimate of the true efficiencies to be expected 
from the merger – that the efficiencies included in the “economic model” do not, for example, 
include the $39 billion of efficiencies included in the second category discussed above. 
Thus we may confidently infer that the parties were claiming something at least in the range 
of 13.6 to 25.8 percent in cost reductions from the merger, and perhaps higher.  (Recall that the 
merging parties characterize them as “immense”.)  We argue in the next section of the paper that 
this is a fairly remarkable claim for an already very large provider of mobile telephone services. 
First, however, let us note in passing that the FCC staff was quite sceptical of these 
efficiency claims – labelling them “seriously flawed”, “implausible”, and “extremely sensitive to 
adjustments” (Staff Analysis at ¶138) – though on the grounds of a close examination of the 
engineering model on which they were based rather than on the grounds examined in this paper.  
In particular, according to the Staff Analysis, the companies calculate merger efficiencies by 
projecting the costs of the two firms going forward independently, as demand increases and 
capacity levels are reached at the level of local markets, and then comparing those “but-for” 
costs with the costs of the combined firm under the same conditions.  The staff objects first to the 
companies’ extrapolation of their calculations for fifteen local markets to the totality of areas 
served by the two firms, as “the fifteen markets chosen by the Applicants do not seem to be 
particularly representative” (¶169). 
More fundamentally, though, the staff believes that the methodology used to calculate costs 
in the but-for world “contains a serious flaw in the cell-splitting algorithm that appears to cause 
the model to greatly overestimate incremental costs, and the overestimate is much greater for the 
standalone firms than the merged firm” (¶147).  In particular, the methodology modelled by 
which the companies would address growing tightness in capacity “is not rational and does not 
reflect how any wireless provider would operate or model its business….  As a result, the 
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Applicants significantly overstate the estimated cost savings of the proposed transaction” (¶¶175-
76). 
Finally, let us note that at least one component of the second category of claimed efficiencies 
appears to confuse private benefits with public benefits.  One of the sub-categories is labelled 
“cost savings … from combining the networks”, and one element of this subcategory is 
described as follows:  “savings from a reduction in interconnection and toll expenses as a result 
of switching [T-Mobile calls] to existing AT&T facilities where possible for transport.”4  There 
is no estimate reported of the value of these efficiencies, though the sub-category of which they 
are a part is estimated to provide efficiencies of $10 billion in net present value.5
The FCC staff report includes the “reduction in interconnection and toll expenses” as one of 
many elements of the efficiencies claims where it is difficult to determine what portion of the 
efficiencies should be counted as savings in fixed charges and what portion in variable charges, 
under the traditional thinking that savings in the latter are more likely to be passed along 
downstream in the form of lower prices than are savings in the former.
 
6
It appears, however – it is impossible to be sure from the public record – that the FCC staff 
critique does not go far enough in this case.  In fact the actual amount of interconnection and toll 
expenses that are paid by TMU to AT&T pre-merger and would be internal to the firm post-
merger should count as a transfer, not a savings in resources.  The only portion of this flow that 
constitutes a true efficiency comes from the fact that the internal transfer price for this service 
should be at marginal cost rather than something higher, in which case “double marginalization” 
is avoided and the merged firm would have the incentive to expand output accordingly.  Both 
CSS and their fellow AT&T consultants Robert Willig, Jonathan Orszag, and Jay Ezrielev note 
that the merger eliminates pre-merger double marginalization in this area, but neither these nor 
other statements sponsored by the merging firms states that the resulting merger efficiencies are 
only those flowing from this particular incentive for output expansion, rather than the entire 
volume of cost savings from the internalization of these flows.
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3. The Literature on Scale Economies, Particularly in Network Industries 
 
Early, seminal texts by Marshall (1920) and Viner (1931) discussed the importance of “net 
internal economies of large-scale production”.  Kahn (1971) and others applied this concept to 
the possibility that a single firm might be a “natural monopoly … [where there] is an inherent 
tendency to decreasing unit costs over the entire extent of the market.”  Some commentators 
                                                 
4 Declaration of Rick L. Moore, at ¶34.  Virtually the same language is in the parties’ merger application to the FCC, at p. 52. 
5 Declaration of Rick L., Moore, at ¶34. 
6 FCC Staff report, at ¶228.  Note that CSS (at ¶65-71) argue that this principle should not apply in this matter. 
7 CSS Reply Declaration at ¶143; Willig, Orszag, and Ezrielev Reply Declaration, at footnote 106. 
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have applied this concept to the AT&T/T-Mobile merger.  For example, Goldfarb (2011), noted 
that 
The mobile wireless industry is characterized by economies of scale and scope.  In a 
static market, it would be less costly and/or more efficient to build out and operate a 
single network instead of multiple networks with partially duplicative facilities; to give a 
single provider use of a large block of spectrum rather than giving a number of providers 
use of a subset of that block; and to design and mass produce a single suite of handsets 
rather than making handsets for smaller groups of customers using many different 
standards and network technologies. 
This sounds reasonable, and yet it seems to suggest at least two follow-up questions.  First, 
are we considering here local or national economies of scale?  And second, do these economies 
exist for all relevant levels of demand – so that the firm may be a “natural monopoly” – or are 
they exhausted at some point, after which increases in output are accompanied by proportional or 
even greater than proportional increases in cost? 
Regarding the first question, for decades now the economic literature on network industries 
has made the useful distinction between economies of overall system size and economies of 
density.  Walters (2007) summarizes the difference succinctly in the railways context: 
A significant development in all of this research [in “rail cost analysis”] was refining the 
distinction between economies of scale and density.  The latter is the behavior of costs as 
output expands over a given network, whereas economies of scale focuses on the 
behavior of costs if the network size increases as output expands. 
Similarly, Caves, Christensen, and Tretheway (1984) make the distinction in their analysis of 
airline costs: 
“We define returns to density as the proportional increase in output made possible by a 
proportional increase in all inputs, with points served, average stage length, average load 
factor, and input prices held fixed….  We define returns to scale as the proportional 
increase in output and points served made possible by a proportional increase in all 
inputs, with average stage length, average load factor, and input prices held fixed.”  
(emphasis in original) 
It seems useful, indeed important, to make this distinction in the present case of the market 
for mobile telephony.  A significant portion of the economies claimed by AT&T for the merger 
seem to be some variant on economies of density, involving as they do the more efficient 
utilization of (especially) spectrum and cell towers in particular metropolitan areas.  However, 
other claimed economies are firm-wide in scope and independent of the density of local areas, 
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including those associated with marketing, customer service, procurement, and overall company 
administration. 
All of this raises the crucial question:  How reasonable is it to assume that under current (i.e. 
without the merger) conditions, AT&T and T-Mobile enjoy substantial unexhausted economies 
of density and size of national operations?  Recall that the fragmentary estimates made public 
suggest claims of at least 10-15 percent reductions in cost, and perhaps 25 percent or more.  
Absent an econometric examination of mobile telephony for the US as a whole as well as for 
individual metropolitan areas, what can we infer from the existing literature? 
The literature on at least one other network industry is not particularly supportive.  In the 
freight railways sector, the literature suggests that in Western Europe, the railways have reached 
efficient scale in terms of system size but have not exhausted all available economies of density.8
What about mobile telephony?  Here we are hampered by both the very dynamic nature of 
the industry – so that even fairly recent data may not well reflect economies going forward – as 
well as the paucity of publicly available data, especially regarding economies of density.  One of 
the most knowledgeable of U.S. analysts, Ingo Vogelsang (2010), in a survey article laments the 
lack of convincing studies but seems to lean toward believing in constant returns to scale, even 
with regard to economies of density: 
  
In the much larger and more intensely operated US freight railroads, however, the most recent 
study suggests that the largest companies have reached or are reaching minimum efficient scale 
in both system size and density (Christensen Associates, 2008). 
“The case for constant returns comes from the observation that a doubling of traffic leads 
to cell splitting and increases the number of cells required even in the same area, roughly 
doubling costs.” 
Writing eight years earlier, Cave, Majumdar, and Vogelsang (2002) seem to agree: 
“If the econometric models were to be relied on, there would be a strong case for 
pursuing infrastructure competition throughout the network.  If the engineering models 
were to be relied on, infrastructure competition in local areas would make sense only in 
very dense networks, where economies of density are exhausted….  [C]onceptually, there 
could exist two important ranges of natural monopoly. 
In the first stage, the natural monopoly property can be weak.  In this range, economies of 
scale and scope are almost exhausted and sunk costs tend to be small.  In this situation, 
competition is likely to be beneficial, because it leads to pressure on costs, prices and 
innovation.  Competition is also likely to occur here, because in most 
telecommunications markets demand is moderately to strongly inelastic.  Thus, we can 
                                                 
8 See the discussion in Pittman (2007), discussing, among others, the results of Savignat and Nash (1999). 
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expect duplicate network investments, associated with some cost inefficiency and excess 
capacity, but possibly lower prices than under regulated monopoly.  This is the case of 
long-distance services, mobile telephony and local business services in downtown areas 
of industrialized countries” (pp. 30-10). 
In fact the parties’ own engineering experts concede at least the possibility of the effective 
exhaustion of economies of density in one area; they note that “the percentage gains from 
channel pooling diminish as the size of the pool increases”.9  And all of this would be consistent 
with the findings of Gabel and Kennet (1991) that for the local fixed wire network, economies of 
density are exhausted in densely populated urban areas.10
Most of the existing empirical literature features observations at the firm level, with output 
measured as number of subscribers or, less frequently, revenues or airtime minutes.  These 
studies tend to find constant returns to scale or even decreasing returns to scale for the largest 
operators – i.e., generally U-shaped cost curves.  These papers include McKenzie and Small 
(1997), examining five US firms; Gagnepain and Pereira (2007), three Portuguese firms; 
Vendruscolo and Alves (2009), 38 Brazilian firms (the number declining over time); and Nam, 
Kwon, Kim, and Lee (2009), three Korean firms.  The only paper we have found directly related 
to economies of density in local mobile telephone markets is Foreman and Beauvais (1999), 
which uses internal, local market level data for GTE, at the time a supplier in primarily rural 
areas with coverage of a few urban areas in California and Florida, and finds economies of scale 
with respect to the number of subscribers, controlling for airtime minutes per cell site.  Even this 
paper finds economies for mobile telephony “below those that have been estimated for wireline 
technology.” 
 
In (unsatisfying) summary, the literature suggests that it is unlikely that a firm as large as 
AT&T – and perhaps T-Mobile as well – is operating at a point on its overall enterprise cost 
curve of substantial unexhausted economies of scale.  With regard to economies of density at the 
metropolitan level, the little evidence available is more supportive of the presence of at least 
some unexhausted economies of density in some locations, though not in the most dense urban 
areas.  But even in that case we may justifiably ask whether if one believes the evidence of 
“immense” economies presented by the merging companies, one should take the next step and 
consider whether mobile telephony in U.S. cities is a “natural monopoly”, with declining costs 
throughout the relevant regions of demand? 
                                                 
9 However, they proceed to suggest that “the vast majority” of locations served by the merging firms still “have characteristics 
that will permit large gains.”  Jeffrey Reed and Nishith Tripathi, “AT&T/T-Mobile:  Further Analysis of Capacity, Spectrum 
Efficiency and Service Quality Gains from Network Integration”, at p. 7. 
10 The authors find that those areas with unexhausted economies of density (though they do not use this term) are “slightly higher 
than the high end of the density found in districts dominated by single family homes” (Gabel and Kennet [1991, at 77]). 
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In fact one party challenging the merger at the FCC, the Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users 
Committee, makes this precise point, both on its own and in an attached Declaration by 
economist Lee Selwyn.  They two begin by noting at least an implicit tension between the 
merging parties’ contention that only this merger can ease the capacity constraints faced by each 
firm separately, and the merging parties’ simultaneous contention that the merger could not be 
anticompetitive because much smaller firms like MetroPCS and Cellular South would easily 
expand in order to discipline any post-merger price increase.  They then go on to make the 
argument that if firms as large as AT&T and T-Mobile can achieve “immense” cost reductions 
through merging their operations, presumably AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon would achieve 
even greater economies by merging.  In other words, if the efficiencies claimed by the parties are 
correct, then unless (for example) economies of density in the industry are coincidentally 
exhausted at the point of around 40 percent of current capacity – and the parties make no such 
claim, much less provide evidence for it – then mobile telephony may well be a sector 
characterized by natural monopoly, and the FCC should rely on regulation rather than 
competition going forward. 
The FCC staff analysis does not appear to address this point.  CSS, in their Reply Declaration, 
simply state that in that case every industry in which merging parties claim economies of scale or 
scope must be a natural monopoly – hardly a serious response, given the traditional relevance of 
the concept of natural monopoly in infrastructure sectors such as telecommunications.  Certainly 
overall it seems that the economic analysis that uses the engineering model and its associated 
efficiencies claims in support of a precompetitive outcome to this merger is implicitly assuming 
a very specific, and arguably unlikely, state of the world regarding the existence of unexhausted 
economies of firm size and metropolitan area density in the provision of mobile telephony, with 
no econometric support. 
In the next section we describe our own analysis of economies of scale in mobile telephony 
at the firm level, using the most recent data available. 
4. Methodology 
In this section, we describe briefly the measure, in the literature, used for economies of scale. 
We then focus on the frontier model used in this present study for the evaluation of firm scale 
efficiency as our preferred measure of scale economies.11
The most convenient measure for economies of scale in the literature is the return to scale 
(RTS),
   
12
                                                 
11 Appendix A presents non-parametric data envelope analysis (DEA) results for a robustness check to our conclusion. 
 which is, by geometrical point of view, defined as measuring how accurately the 
12 See for example Baumol (1976).  
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distance in input space reflects the distance in output space.13  In our case with multiple inputs, 
we require to look at ray average productivity increases (decreases) with an increase in the 
overall inputs scale when RTS exceeds (falls short of) unity.14
The other measure documented in the recent literature is named scale efficiency (SE), which 
measures the ray average productivity at the observed inputs scale on the production frontier 
relative to the maximum ray average productivity attainable at a vector of inputs bundle (x) 
characterized by constant return to scale (CRS). The SE is equal to one, indicates the firm at the 
most productive scale size as defined by Banker et al. (1984). That is also the only point where 
the CRS prevails, and SE is equal to the overall RTS.  Elsewhere SE is below unity regardless of 
whether scale (inputs) elasticity is greater than or less than one (Ray, 1998).  Given the multiple 
inputs application in this study, we prefer the later measure of scale economies, using SE, which 
can be estimated using stochastic frontier approach. 
  
Given a panel dataset we have, this study considers a true fixed effects stochastic production 
frontier model specified for panel data as proposed by Greene (2004, 2005):15
                        
 
TtNiuvxy itititiit ,...,2,1;,...,2,1,' ==−++= βα ,                               (1)  
where ity  is the (logarithm) output of the i-th firm in the t-th year; itx is a vector of (logarithm) 
inputs of the i-th firm in the t-th year; β  is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; iα  
is the firms’ individual specific effects capturing all time invariant effects including unobserved 
heterogeneity, itv is the random error term which is assumed to be i.i.d. (independent and 
identically distributed) with ),0( 2vN σ  distribution and independent of itu – the inefficiency term 
that vary freely through time with ),( 2uitN σµ  distribution.  
We firstly conduct three likelihood ratio (LR) specification tests to identify the most 
favourable functional form for our parametric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) model (see 
Table 1 for the test results).  The first model specification test is for the Cobb-Douglas functional 
                                                 
13 For detailed description see Chambers (1988). In other words, RTS is the ratio of the proportionate change in the output to a 
small proportionate change in the input quantity in the single input case or to a small equi-proportionate change in all inputs in 
the multiple inputs case. Specifically, three possible characteristics of production technology can be defined as follows: for a RTS 
exceeds unity, ( ) 1xε , the distance in input space under-estimates the distance in output space, and the production technology 
exhibits increasing returns to scale; for an ( ) 1=xε , the production technology is embodied by constant returns to scale, and the 
isoquant is evenly spaced; and finally for an ( ) 1xε , the distance in input space over-estimates the distance in output space, 
and the production technology shows decreasing returns to scale (and of course, such returns to scale properties hold, in general, 
only locally). 
14 See Ray (1998). In the single-input, single-output case, average productivity increases with the input quantity when the 
technology exhibits increasing returns. In the multiple inputs case, the average productivity is not defined in the usual sense, and 
ray average productivity is introduced instead of.  
15  This model has several distinct advantages: (1) allowing technical inefficiency effects to vary freely through time; (2) 
dispensing with the undesirable assumption that the firm inefficiency and heterogeneity are uncorrelated with the input variables; 
(3) controlling the effect of unobservable & time invariant heterogeneity on measuring inefficiency. See Greene (2004ab; 2005) 
for a comprehensive discussion and comparison of different stochastic frontier models.  
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form versus the Translog functional form.16 The second test is related to time effects that indicate 
the existence of significant technical change.17  The last test is to identify the distribution of the 
inefficiency error term. 18
                            
  According to our LR test results, the preferred empirical frontier 
model for our study is a translog stochastic production function with the inclusion of time effects, 
and normal-truncated normal distribution in the inefficiency errors.  The SFA model is specified 
as: 
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The more expanded form can be written as:  
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where the one output and three inputs of the i-th firm in the t-th year are all measured in 
quantities and in logarithm form (Lit, Mit and Kit denote the quantities of the labour input, 
material input and capital input of the i-th firm in the t-th year, respectively). The time trend 
variable, T, is included to capture the technical change which may affect the location of 
production frontier. 
To calculate firm SE scores, we exploit the output-oriented measure of scale efficiency 
developed by Ray (1998) from an empirically estimated single output and multiple inputs 
translog production function.19
                                                   
  The output-oriented SE for the i-th firm in the t-th year can be 
calculated using  
( ) ( )( )





 −
=
β
ε
2
1exp
2
itit
itit
xxSE ,                                           (4) 
                                                 
16 H0: Cobb-Douglas specification is preferred (βkj = βkτ = βττ = 0, k, j = 1, 2, 3). According to model estimation results, LR = 
2(Loglu-Loglr) = 2(-19.13693-(-32.11519) = 25.96 > χ2(10) = 18.31. Hence, we reject H0 in favour of more flexible translog 
model specification. 
17 H0: No time effects in the model, i.e. no technological change (βτ = βkτ = βττ = 0, k = 1, 2, 3). According to model estimation 
results, LR = 2(Loglu-Loglr) = 2(-19.13693-(-28.35059) = 18.43 > χ2(5) = 11.07. Hence, we reject H0, and find evidence of the 
existence of significant technological change. 
18 H0: .0),,(~ 2 =iuii Nu µσµ i.e. normal-half normal distribution. According to model estimation results, LR = 2(Loglu-Loglr) = 
2(43.483-25.634) = 35.69 > χ2(1) = 3.84. Hence, we reject H0, and in favor of the normal-truncated normal distribution model.  
19  The input-oriented measure of scale efficiency is identical to the output-oriented measure, in the absence of technical 
inefficiency, i.e. uit = 0. In the more general case involving technical inefficiency, the input-oriented scale efficiency is then 
calculated using 
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, where uit is the estimated technical inefficiency of the i-th firm in the t-th year using the 
‘true’ fixed effects procedure; and all the other terms are the same as those defined in the output-oriented measure, Equation (4).  
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where εit(xit) is the overall RTS of the i-th firm in the t-th year, estimated using equation (5) 
described below; ∑∑
= =
=
3
1
3
1k j
kjββ , assumed to be negative to ensure 1)( ≤itit xSE .  The SEit scores 
are between zero and one, where a value equals one indicating the firm at the most productive 
scale size.  Below we demonstrate the calculation of the RTS from the specified translog 
production function.  
Given the preferred translog production function, which is non-homothetic and imposes no 
restrictions on production technology, the elasticity of the output with respect to the inputs is a 
function of the inputs and time trend variable.20
( ) ∑
= ∂
∂
=
3
1 ln
ln
k kit
it
itit x
yxε
  That is for any given inputs level, the RTS is 
, where yit is the output and xkit is a vector of three inputs. Thus, the RTS for 
the i-th firm in the t-th year can be calculated directly from the empirically estimated parameters 
in the production function (4) using 
                                        ( ) ∑ ∑
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Detailed data information on mobile carriers’ operation output and inputs are described in the 
next section.  
5. Data 
The output and inputs data used for calculating firms’ scale efficiencies are extracted from 
mobile carriers’ annual reports.  An unbalanced panel dataset is in turn compiled for twenty-two 
mobile network providers, over 1998-2007, from seven countries selected to represent different 
regions and major economic powers, including the USA, Canada, the UK, France, Germany, 
China and Korea.21  Table 2 lists the names of these mobile carriers, their served market regions, 
and the time periods observed.22
                                                 
20 For a homothetic production function, the marginal rate of technical substitution is homogeneous of degree zero in inputs, 
which requires ∑ jβkj = 0, yielding a Kmenta approximation of the CES function. The production function is homogeneous of 
degree φ if ∑kβk = φ, ∑jβkj = 0, and ∑kβkτ = 0. Linear homogeneity obtains if φ = 1, i.e. constant returns to scale.  
  
21 Seven representative countries (i.e. six from the OECD members plus China) are selected to conduct this firm-level efficiency 
and productivity study, involving two North-American countries, three European countries and two East-Asian countries (the 
Japanese mobile carriers are not included primarily due to severe lack of data information on the inputs). The twenty-two mobile 
network providers cover the main mobile network operators in each selected country, based on their market share. Most selected 
network providers are ranked as the top twenty mobile operators by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). 
22 The output and inputs are recorded as what happened in the individual specific operating market of each firm. For example, we 
record the inputs used by Vodafone in the UK mobile market for producing the output in the UK mobile market only as the inputs 
and output for Vodafone UK; and record the inputs used by Vodafone in the German mobile market for producing the output in 
the German mobile market only as the inputs and output for Vodafone Germany; and so forth. In addition, all output and inputs 
information used in this current study is for the mobile phone service segment only. 
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• Output measures 
Output value is measured by total operating revenue from the mobile service segment.  It 
typically consists of network service revenue (i.e. voice services, messaging and other data 
services) and sales of terminal equipment, but excludes interest income, disposals, capital 
gains/losses and dividends.23
Output price is used to deflate the value of output into a quantity measure that is consistent 
across carriers. Output price is based on the national average mobile price index, calculated for 
each sample country and collected from ITU.   
  
Output quantity is measured by total operating revenue deflated by the average mobile price 
index in each country in US$s at 2000 prices. 
 
• Input measures 
(i) Labour quantity is the number of employees working in the mobile service segment.  
      (ii) Material cost is measured by non-personnel operating expenses in the mobile service 
segment.  It consists primarily of consumption of goods and merchandise, services obtained from 
outside suppliers, materials, cost of acquisition and maintenance of customer services, and 
administration.  
Material price is used to deflate material cost into quantity measure that is consistent across 
carriers. Material price is proxied by a producer price index (PPI) for a manufacturing products 
basket (2000 = 100).  The PPI data are available for all sample countries in this study at the 
OECD online statistical database.  
Material quantity is PPI deflated non-personnel operating expenses. 
(iii) Capital cost is measured by the total depreciation and amortization of property, plant and 
equipment in the mobile service segment in each year.  
Capital price is proxied by the weighted average cost of borrowings reported in carrier 
annual reports.24
                                                 
23 The information on the sales of terminal equipments were only separately reported by a very few carriers in our sample. We 
cannot separate this value from the total operating revenue at a consistent basis across all firms. However, based on those 
information reported, the equipment sales only count very small proportion of the total revenue.  
 
24 There is a debate in measuring the price (cost) of capital. In the existing literature of telecoms efficiency and productivity study, 
various measures have been used, with two in particular. The first one is related to the rate of depreciation. The second one uses 
PPI as a deflator of capital expense. Since we have used PPI as a proxy of material price to deflate money value of material 
expenses into the quantity measure of material input, the second PPI proxy is thus not preferred if a better proxy is available. As 
for the first one, depreciation rate, is little suitable for measuring the capital price in the mobile network industry, since the 
depreciation rate for mobile network carriers is very high, and in many cases even exceeds 100%. Therefore, the results are 
highly likely to be distorted when using depreciation rate related measure of capital price in our frontier estimation.  
    Despite that to the authors’ knowledge, the method of weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is a common practice used in 
accounting and finance to approach cost of capital (see e.g., Bruner et al. 1998; Truong et al. 2008); this approach cannot be 
applied in this study as a result of lack of financial and stock market information for most of sample mobile carriers. Accordingly, 
the closest measure – weighted average cost of borrowings (WACB) – is used as the proxy of capital price. 
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Capital quantity is calculated by dividing capital cost by capital price. 
Table 3 summarizes the statistics of the output and inputs (labour, material and capital) over 
1998-2007 (i.e. calculated means across 22 mobile carriers by year). The first four columns 
present the money values in US$s, and followed by the converted quantities in the same order.  
We use the quantity measures of the output and inputs in our SFA model estimating scale 
efficiencies for those twenty-two mobile carriers over their observation years. 
6. Results 
In this section, we present the results of our SFA estimation regarding scale economies for 
the sample mobile network companies.  
Table 4 presents the SE and RTS scores for each firm across their observation years.25  The 
results suggest that on average, most mobile network operators in our sample (16 out of 22) 
operate in the region of constant returns to scale, with their average SE scores insignificantly 
different from one.26
In Graph 1, the firms are presented in an ascending order of firm sizes measured by their 
2007 total revenue in the mobile service segment and showing their estimated SE and RTS 
scores.  Note that AT&T and T-Mobile USA both are among the firms that appear to be 
operating in the range of constant returns.
  The RTS estimates indicate that on average, almost all observed firms 
operate in either constant (i.e., the mean average RTS cross-year are equal to or very close to 1) 
or mildly increasing returns to scale.  For example, KTF, LG Telecom, Orange France and 
Rogers show an average RTS at 1.12, 1.14, 1.06 and 1.02, respectively. 
27  There are three firms – Verizon Wireless, T-Mobile 
Germany, and China Mobile – operating in the range where we estimate decreasing returns to 
scale, with an average RTS significantly less than one (in fact below 0.9).28
                                                 
25 DEA estimated SE sores for each mobile carriers over their observation years are reported in the 1st column of Table 4 for 
reference.  See Appendix B for the decomposed inputs elasticities in detail.   
   
26 In contrast, the DEA results reported in Appendix A: Graph 2, suggest that there are relatively fewer firms (10 out of 22) at the 
MPSS. However, we concern the results with accumulated statistical errors given the inability of statistical underpinning of DEA.   
27 Due to the lack of detailed information on each individual input measure, we cannot include AT&T in our frontier analysis. The 
AT&T’s RTS and SE scores are fitted using the information on the aggregated total costs and total revenues from the company’s 
annual financial reports over 2002-2007. The results summary is presented in Appendix C.  
28 See Appendix C for detail. 
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Graph 1: Average SE and RTS across firms  
 
 
Table 5 presents, using the most recent data we have, a snap-shot of 2007 measures of the 
firms’ economies of scale along with the national regulatory standards for their mobile network 
markets. 29
7. Conclusion 
  The results further emphasize that in a regulatory system featured by active 
competition among privatized oligopolies, the firms generally operate within the range of 
constant returns to scale; we find no evidence for substantial unexhausted economies of scale in 
mobile telecoms.   
Using stochastic frontier analysis, in this study, we investigated scale efficiency as a measure 
of scale economies for twenty-two mobile carriers from seven countries over the period 1998-
2007.  We did not find substantial unexhausted scale economies in mobile telephony in general, 
especially for firms of medium to large size. Most firms we studied operate at their most 
productive scale size over their observation years, with a few exhibiting slightly increasing 
returns along with a few large operators exhibiting decreasing returns. 
Regarding the proposed merger of AT&T and T-Mobile, obviously it would have been 
desirable to have the more localized data necessary to test for the presence of unexhausted 
economies of density.  The conjectures in the literature lean toward the view the in mobile 
telephony, as in railways, the large, dense networks have exhausted available economies of 
density, but the empirical evidence for this view is lacking.  Nevertheless our results concerning 
economies of firm size are consistent with those in the literature, suggesting that it is unlikely 
that T-Mobile, and very unlikely that AT&T, are currently operating in a range where large firm-
level economies related to activities such as procurement, marketing, customer service, and 
                                                 
29 The data information on national regulatory standards were extracted from Li & Lyons’s (2012) study.  
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administration would have been achievable due to the merger.  Regarding both measures, the 
presence of “immense” unexhausted economies for the two firms seems unlikely indeed.  On this 
basis (and on this basis alone), our results support the decision of DOJ to challenge the merger 
and the scepticism expressed by the FCC staff. 
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Table 1: Hypotheses tests for parameters of the SFPF models and final model estimation results 
Null hypothesis LogLH1  (unrestricted model) 
LogLH0  
(restricted model) 
LR 
statistics 
Critical 
value Decision 
A. H0: Cobb-Douglas model 
is preferred (βkj = βkτ = βττ = 
0, k, j = 1, 2, 3) 
-19.137 -32.115 25.96 18.31 Reject H0, in favour of translog model 
B. H0: no technical change 
(time effects) (βτ = βkτ = βττ = 
0, k = 1, 2, 3) 
-19.137 -28.351 18.43 11.07 
Reject H0, significant 
technical change 
exists 
C. H0: normal-half normal 
model is preferred (μ=0) 43.483 25.634 35.69 3.84 
Reject H0, normal- 
truncated normal 
model is preferred 
Maximum-likelihood estimates of translog normal-truncated normal model    
          
βl 0.068 (0.107)  βττ 0.003 (0.002)    
βm 0.770 (0.179)  βlm -0.316 (0.095)    
βk 0.054 (0.079)  βlk 0.138 (0.054)    
βτ -0.030 (0.038)  βmk -0.018 (0.056)    
βll 0.045 (0.039)  βlτ 0.018 (0.012)    
βmm 0.220 (0.074)  βmτ -0.023 (0.020)    
βkk -0.091 (0.022)  βkτ 0.012 (0.009)    
          
λ 6.231 (1.714)        
σ 0.568 (0.119)               
Note: standard errors are presented in the parentheses next to the coefficients. The first-order coefficient estimates may be 
interpreted as production elasticities at the sample mean because the data was mean-corrected prior to estimation. 
 
Table 2: List of the names, operating markets and years for observed mobile carriers 
Unit-
code Firm name 
Regional 
market 
Periods 
covered 
No. 
years 
Unit-
code Firm name 
Regional 
market 
Periods 
covered 
No. 
years 
D1 China Mobile               China 98-07 10 D12 E-plus           DE 02-07 6 
D2 China Unicom               China 98-07 10 D13 Orange France     FR 02-07 6 
D3 Vodafone UK       UK 99-07 9 D14 Bouygues Telecom FR 01-07 7 
D4 O2UK             UK 99-07 9 D15 SFR              FR 98-07 10 
D5 Orange UK         UK 02-07 6 D16 SK Telecom       Korea 98-07 10 
D6 Orange FT         -- 99-07 9 D17 KTF              Korea 98-07 10 
D7 T-mobile         -- 01-07 7 D18 LG Telecom       Korea 98-07 10 
D8 T-mobile Europe   Europe 05-07 3 D19 Sprint Nextel    US 98-07 10 
D9 T-mobile USA      US 05-07 3 D20 Verizon Wireless US 98-07 10 
D10 O2Germany        DE 00-07 8 D21 Rogers Wireless  Canada 98-07 10 
D11 Vodafone Germany  DE 02-07 6 D22 Telus (Mobility) Canada 99-07 9 
Note: Consolidated information is used for DMU6 and DMU7.  
 
Table 3: Summary statistics of output and inputs for twenty-two mobile carriers from 1998 to 2007 
 OutputQ LQ MQ KQ OutputV LV MV KV 
 Mean 
1998 23.13 7890.11 15.07 70.74 2217.42 291.24 1467.84 458.79 
1999 34.30 9980.46 23.86 88.26 3351.74 362.25 2315.60 571.66 
2000 46.94 14744.36 29.51 126.65 4694.43 468.33 2951.40 809.09 
2001 61.24 18211.00 38.64 223.92 6282.31 656.59 3870.76 1321.48 
2002 69.66 17336.25 41.30 537.59 7265.85 697.77 4114.11 3172.00 
2003 86.20 17802.60 49.82 251.06 9183.40 852.65 5036.10 1437.22 
2004 101.63 20665.05 58.69 345.41 11068.81 1033.38 6152.10 1858.38 
2005 119.37 22620.09 69.49 425.45 13342.51 1191.90 7587.28 2237.05 
2006 134.32 23816.05 75.05 460.50 15398.83 1511.33 8467.77 2640.58 
2007 152.31 25495.64 86.14 462.32 17812.51 1672.61 9991.60 2864.78 
Average annual  
change rate 23.82% 14.83% 22.16% 33.47% 26.58% 21.82% 24.46% 32.34% 
Note: OutputQ is the quantity of output; LQ, MQ and KQ are the quantities of labour, material and capital inputs, respectively. 
OutputV is the value of output; LV, MV and KV are the values of labour, material and capital inputs, respectively; all money 
values are measured in million (US$s).  
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Table 4: Summary of DEA and SFA SE & RTS estimates across units over observed years 
  China Mobile China Unicom Vodafone UK O2UK Orange UK 
  SED SES RTS SED SES RTS SED SES RTS SED SES RTS SED SES RTS 
1998 0.999 0.943 0.87 0.716 0.955 0.884 
         1999 1 0.894 0.819 0.853 0.928 0.853 1 0.996 0.965 0.91 1 1.005 
   2000 1 0.852 0.784 0.901 0.87 0.798 1 0.998 0.974 0.978 1 1.003 
   2001 1 0.866 0.795 0.865 0.907 0.831 0.977 0.987 0.937 0.944 0.998 0.973 
   2002 1 0.811 0.753 0.942 0.871 0.799 0.992 0.991 0.949 0.985 0.961 0.892 0.991 0.994 0.957 
2003 0.999 0.829 0.766 0.986 0.924 0.849 0.998 0.999 0.98 0.988 1 1 0.999 0.998 0.978 
2004 1 0.799 0.744 0.997 0.925 0.849 0.992 0.993 0.953 0.997 1 0.998 0.995 0.994 0.96 
2005 0.966 0.788 0.736 0.994 0.91 0.835 0.999 0.997 0.971 1 0.999 0.987 1 1 1.004 
2006 0.774 0.817 0.757 0.999 0.928 0.852 0.978 1 0.989 0.999 0.991 0.95 1 0.997 1.028 
2007 0.833 0.852 0.784 1 0.93 0.855 0.968 1 1.004 0.988 1 0.999 1 0.991 1.052 
Mean 0.967 0.87 0.804 0.925 0.915 0.84 0.989 0.995 0.969 0.976 0.994 0.979 0.997 0.996 0.996 
  Orange FT T-mobile T-mobile Europe T-mobile USA O2Germany 
  SED SES RTS SED SES RTS SED SES RTS SED SES RTS SED SES RTS 
1999 0.901 0.996 0.968 
            2000 0.858 0.988 0.941 
         
0.143 0.999 0.981 
2001 0.936 0.971 0.908 0.645 0.916 0.84 
      
0.988 1 1.005 
2002 0.888 0.969 0.905 0.71 0.84 0.775 
      
0.886 0.928 0.852 
2003 0.926 0.981 0.926 0.907 0.977 0.918 
      
0.879 0.992 1.05 
2004 0.92 0.974 0.912 0.915 0.984 0.931 
      
0.807 0.991 1.052 
2005 0.931 0.984 0.932 0.872 0.973 0.91 0.866 0.994 0.957 0.989 0.986 0.935 0.849 0.994 1.042 
2006 0.819 0.99 0.945 0.887 0.972 0.908 0.904 0.992 0.952 0.931 0.987 0.938 1 0.967 0.901 
2007 0.884 0.992 0.953 0.845 0.972 0.909 0.902 0.991 0.95 0.968 0.989 0.943 1 1 0.993 
Mean 0.896 0.983 0.932 0.826 0.948 0.884 0.891 0.992 0.953 0.962 0.987 0.939 0.819 0.984 0.984 
  Vodafone Germany E-plus Orange France Bouygues Telecom SFR 
  SED SES RTS SED SES RTS SED SES RTS SED SES RTS SED SES RTS 
1998 
            
0.947 0.986 0.935 
1999 
            
0.933 0.996 0.965 
2000 
            
0.977 0.995 0.962 
2001 
         
1 0.998 0.976 0.963 0.971 0.907 
2002 1 0.992 0.953 0.883 0.898 0.823 1 0.999 1.019 0.92 1 0.994 0.985 0.992 0.951 
2003 1 0.997 0.973 0.879 1 1.001 1 0.995 1.039 0.984 1 0.998 0.964 1 0.991 
2004 1 0.991 0.948 0.778 0.994 1.041 1 0.993 1.044 0.998 0.999 1.013 0.961 1 0.988 
2005 1 0.991 0.948 0.835 0.994 1.043 1 0.984 1.068 0.998 0.994 1.04 0.999 0.997 1.028 
2006 0.977 0.993 0.956 0.891 0.993 1.044 1 0.984 1.069 0.999 0.998 1.021 0.998 0.997 1.031 
2007 1 0.998 0.973 0.978 0.985 1.067 1 0.949 1.124 0.99 0.995 1.04 0.998 0.983 1.072 
Mean 0.996 0.994 0.959 0.874 0.977 1.003 1 0.984 1.06 0.984 0.998 1.012 0.973 0.991 0.983 
  SK Telecom KTF LG Telecom Sprint Nextel Verizon Wireless 
  SED SES RTS SED SES RTS SED SES RTS SED SES RTS SED SES RTS 
1998 1 0.967 0.9 1 0.885 1.188 1 0.872 1.2 0.756 0.989 0.943 1 0.877 0.804 
1999 0.957 0.997 0.969 1 0.887 1.187 0.907 0.922 1.153 0.762 0.972 0.91 1 0.869 0.798 
2000 1 0.993 0.954 1 0.959 1.111 0.988 0.946 1.128 0.844 0.952 0.881 0.927 0.853 0.785 
2001 1 0.996 0.966 1 0.966 1.1 1 0.934 1.141 0.942 0.949 0.876 0.908 0.83 0.767 
2002 1 0.997 0.972 1 0.974 1.087 0.972 0.951 1.121 0.906 0.965 0.897 1 0.843 0.777 
2003 1 1 0.997 1 0.981 1.075 0.766 0.974 1.087 0.916 0.975 0.914 1 0.861 0.791 
2004 0.999 0.999 0.981 1 0.974 1.087 0.94 0.939 1.135 0.922 0.983 0.928 1 0.849 0.781 
2005 1 1 1 1 0.974 1.088 0.883 0.947 1.126 0.885 0.987 0.938 1 0.861 0.791 
2006 0.982 0.999 1.014 1 0.958 1.112 1 0.923 1.153 0.877 0.991 0.949 1 0.869 0.797 
2007 0.967 0.998 1.023 1 0.926 1.149 0.814 0.894 1.181 0.791 0.996 0.964 1 0.89 0.815 
Mean 0.993 0.986 0.958 1 0.949 1.118 0.927 0.93 1.142 0.872 0.975 0.918 0.984 0.86 0.791 
  Rogers wireless Telus (Mobility) Mean 
        SED SES RTS SED SES RTS SED SES RTS 
      1998 0.932 0.998 0.974 
   
0.928 0.941 0.966 
      1999 0.851 0.997 0.969 0.859 0.987 0.938 0.918 0.957 0.961 
      2000 0.826 0.999 0.986 0.817 0.985 0.934 0.876 0.956 0.944 
      2001 0.829 0.998 0.974 0.63 0.964 0.897 0.914 0.953 0.931 
      2002 0.82 0.996 1.034 0.873 0.988 0.94 0.938 0.948 0.922 
      2003 0.762 0.992 1.047 0.98 0.997 0.971 0.947 0.974 0.968 
      2004 0.777 1 1 1 0.998 0.978 0.95 0.969 0.966 
      2005 0.89 0.994 1.043 1 0.999 0.987 0.953 0.97 0.973 
      2006 1 0.978 1.08 1 1 0.992 0.955 0.969 0.975 
      2007 1 0.962 1.106 0.992 1 0.998 0.951 0.968 0.998 
      Mean 0.885 0.992 1.014 0.906 0.991 0.96 0.939 0.963 0.959 
      SES is the scale efficiency estimates from SFA; SED is the DEA counterparts as a robustness check.  
RTS is the overall inputs returns to scale.  
RTS = 1 indicates constant return to scale (CRS); RTS < 1 indicates decreasing returns to scale (DRS); and RTS > 1 indicates 
increasing returns to scale (IRS). 
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Table 5: Summary firms’ SE and RTS, 2007, and national regulatory standard for mobile telecoms 
Firm  Ownership 
Independent 
regulator 
Number MNOs 
by 2007 
SE 
(2007) 
RTS 
(2007) 
Average annual GDP 
growth 
China  
 
No 2 
  
9.24% 
China Mobile               state 
  
0.852 0.78 
 China Unicom               state 
  
0.930 0.85 
 Korea  
 
Yes  3 
  
4.33% 
SK Telecom       private (2002) 
  
0.998 1.02 
 KTF              private (2002) 
  
0.926 1.15 
 LG Telecom       private (2002) 
  
0.894 1.18 
 Unite Kingdom 
 
Yes 5 
  
2.76% 
Vodafone UK       private 
  
1.000 1.00 
 O2UK             private 
  
1.000 1.00 
 Orange UK         private 
  
0.991 1.05 
 Deutschland 
 
Yes  4 
  
1.34% 
O2Germany        private 
  
1.000 1.00 
 Vodafone Germany  private 
  
0.998 0.97 
 E-plus           private 
  
0.985 1.07 
 France  
 
Yes  3 
  
2.15% 
Orange France     private 
  
0.949 1.12 
 Bouygues Telecom private 
  
0.995 1.04 
 SFR              private 
  
0.983 1.07 
 Unite Sates 
 
Yes 6 
  
2.98% 
T-mobile USA      private 
  
0.989 0.94 
 Sprint Nextel    private 
  
0.996 0.96 
 Verizon Wireless private 
  
0.890 0.82 
 Canada  
 
Yes 5 
  
3.26% 
Rogers wireless  private 
  
0.962 1.11 
 Telus (Mobility) private     1.000 1.00  
Note: RTS = 1 indicates constant return to scale (CRS); RTS < 1 indicates decreasing returns to scale (DRS); and RTS > 1 
indicates increasing returns to scale (IRS). SE = 1 indicates the most productive scale size. 
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Appendix A: DEA approach to scale efficiency  
In the nonparametric DEA approach, firm scale efficiency can be simply calculated by the 
ratio of technical efficiency (TE) scores measured under constant returns to scale (CRS) over the 
TE scores measured under variable returns to scale (VRS), ie. SEi = TEic/TEiv. 30
                           Maximize w.r.t. 
  The TE of a 
firm is measured relative to the TE of all the other firms in the sample, subject to the restriction 
that all firms are on or below the production frontier. We calculate the output-oriented TE scores 
by solving the linear programme (LP) problem for each firm, with (one) output, yi, and three 
inputs, xi (xi = x1i, x2i, x3i), under an assumption of CRS.  The LP problem is specified as: 
ii φλφ :,  
                           Subject to                  Nsyy
s iiss
,...,2,1,0 =≥−∑ φλ  
                                                                   ,0≥−∑s ssi xx λ  
                                                                   0≥sλ ,                                                          (1) 
where λs is a vector of optimal weights defined by optimization LP problem (with a constraint 
1' =ixβ  to avoid the problem of infinite solutions), such that the efficiency measure of the i-th 
firm is maximized subject to the restriction that the efficiencies of all firms must be less than or 
equal to one, and that all weights are non-negative. In the solution, ∞ iφ1 , and the value of 
1−iφ  measures the extent to which outputs could conceivably be increased using the same inputs 
– relative to other firms in the sample. The value of iφ1  is the output-oriented TE score for the i-
th firm.31 110 ≤iφ  It satisfies , where a value which equals one indicates a point on the 
frontier and hence a technically efficient firm, referring to the Farrell (1957) definition. 
Note that the above TE is measured under the assumption of CRS in which assumes all firms 
are operating at an optimal scale (i.e. corresponding to the flat portion of the long-run average 
                                                 
30 Follow the literature, we use the subscript ‘c’ denotes the CRS assumption; and the subscript ‘v’ denotes the VRS assumption. 
31 An alternative view of the optimization process is to consider the input-oriented efficiency measure, i.e. measuring the extent 
to which the DMU could reduce inputs to obtain the same output – again relative to the standard of other DMUs in the sample. 
The LP problem for input-oriented efficiency measure is specified as: Min. w.r.t. θi, λ: θi      
                                       Subject to          Nsyy
s iss
,...,2,1,0 =≥−∑ λ  
                                                                  ,0∑ ≥− s ssii xx λθ  
                                                                  ,0≥sλ  
where the scalar θi is the input-oriented TE score for the i-th DMU, satisfying ,1≤iθ with a value of one indicating a point on the 
frontier and thus a technically efficient DMU. However, the input-oriented efficiency measure provides the same value as the 
output-oriented efficiency measure under the CRS. In addition, it should be emphasized that the output- and input-oriented 
models will estimate exactly the same frontier and therefore, by definition, identify the same set of DMUs as being efficient. It is 
only the efficiency measures associated with the inefficient DMUs that may differ between the two methods if the VRS is 
assumed. Although the two measures are unequal under the VRS, nevertheless, the influences upon the efficiency scores obtained 
are only minor (Coelli and Perelman, 1996). This point is also confirmed by my data. Hence, in this study, in order to consist with 
Färe et al.’s (1994) CRS (output-oriented) Malmquist TFP measure (also used in this study), the output-oriented efficiency 
measure is chosen. 
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cost curve). However, when not all firms are operating at the optimal scale, the TE scores 
measured by CRS model is confounded by scale efficiencies (SE). Therefore, the assumption is 
relaxed to a VRS model proposed by Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) by adding a restriction, 
1=∑s sλ , so as to permit the calculation of TE devoid of the potential SE effects.  
 
Graph 2: Average SE scores across mobile network providers (DEA estimates)  
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Appendix B: SFA Input Elasticity breakdown 
 
Input Elasticity (returns to scale) estimates from SFA 
 China Mobile China Unicom Vodafone UK O2UK 
 Lrts Mrts Krts RTS Lrts Mrts Krts RTS Lrts Mrts Krts RTS Lrts Mrts Krts RTS 
1998 0.28 0.33 0.26 0.87 0.66 -0.11 0.33 0.88         
1999 0.36 0.23 0.23 0.82 0.62 -0.05 0.28 0.85 0.09 0.60 0.28 0.96 0.02 0.77 0.22 1.00 
2000 0.37 0.18 0.24 0.78 0.61 -0.12 0.31 0.80 0.08 0.60 0.29 0.97 0.06 0.68 0.27 1.00 
2001 0.34 0.32 0.14 0.80 0.52 0.07 0.24 0.83 0.20 0.56 0.17 0.94 0.16 0.57 0.24 0.97 
2002 0.40 0.26 0.09 0.75 0.51 0.06 0.23 0.80 0.22 0.57 0.16 0.95 0.39 0.62 -0.11 0.89 
2003 0.37 0.33 0.07 0.77 0.34 0.33 0.18 0.85 0.15 0.64 0.19 0.98 0.17 0.68 0.15 1.00 
2004 0.41 0.28 0.06 0.74 0.34 0.35 0.16 0.85 0.23 0.66 0.06 0.95 0.17 0.70 0.13 1.00 
2005 0.43 0.29 0.02 0.74 0.37 0.26 0.20 0.83 0.23 0.67 0.07 0.97 0.24 0.66 0.09 0.99 
2006 0.39 0.32 0.05 0.76 0.36 0.28 0.21 0.85 0.23 0.69 0.07 0.99 0.35 0.40 0.20 0.95 
2007 0.34 0.34 0.10 0.78 0.38 0.26 0.22 0.85 0.22 0.72 0.06 1.00 0.23 0.57 0.20 1.00 
Mean 0.38 0.24 0.18 0.80 0.47 0.13 0.24 0.84 0.18 0.63 0.15 0.97 0.20 0.63 0.15 0.98 
 Orange UK Orange FT T-mobile T-mobile Europe 
 Lrts Mrts Krts RTS Lrts Mrts Krts RTS Lrts Mrts Krts RTS Lrts Mrts Krts RTS 
1999     0.04 0.79 0.14 0.97         
2000     0.04 0.72 0.19 0.94         
2001     0.05 0.69 0.17 0.91 0.15 0.69 0.00 0.84     
2002 0.18 0.57 0.21 0.96 0.08 0.69 0.14 0.90 0.31 0.71 -0.24 0.77     
2003 0.16 0.58 0.23 0.98 0.06 0.72 0.15 0.93 0.00 0.78 0.14 0.92     
2004 0.23 0.56 0.16 0.96 0.10 0.72 0.08 0.91 -0.03 0.84 0.12 0.93     
2005 0.17 0.57 0.27 1.00 0.08 0.77 0.09 0.93 0.06 0.78 0.07 0.91 0.08 0.81 0.07 0.96 
2006 0.15 0.58 0.29 1.03 0.05 0.84 0.05 0.95 0.10 0.71 0.10 0.91 0.14 0.73 0.09 0.95 
2007 0.13 0.63 0.29 1.05 0.08 0.82 0.05 0.95 0.10 0.71 0.10 0.91 0.14 0.73 0.08 0.95 
Mean 0.17 0.58 0.24 1.00 0.06 0.75 0.12 0.93 0.10 0.75 0.04 0.88 0.12 0.76 0.08 0.95 
 T-mobile USA O2Germany Vodafone Germany E-plus 
 Lrts Mrts Krts RTS Lrts Mrts Krts RTS Lrts Mrts Krts RTS Lrts Mrts Krts RTS 
2000     0.38 0.07 0.53 0.98         
2001     0.24 0.51 0.25 1.01         
2002     0.63 0.50 -0.28 0.85 0.22 0.65 0.08 0.95 0.68 0.44 -0.29 0.82 
2003     0.21 0.65 0.19 1.05 0.19 0.68 0.10 0.97 0.31 0.64 0.06 1.00 
2004     0.21 0.72 0.13 1.05 0.27 0.67 0.00 0.95 0.27 0.73 0.04 1.04 
2005 0.18 0.59 0.17 0.93 0.27 0.68 0.09 1.04 0.31 0.62 0.03 0.95 0.30 0.75 0.00 1.04 
2006 0.19 0.55 0.20 0.94 0.66 0.22 0.03 0.90 0.33 0.57 0.05 0.96 0.34 0.67 0.04 1.04 
2007 0.20 0.53 0.21 0.94 0.44 0.47 0.09 0.99 0.33 0.60 0.04 0.97 0.34 0.68 0.04 1.07 
Mean 0.19 0.55 0.19 0.94 0.38 0.48 0.13 0.98 0.27 0.63 0.05 0.96 0.37 0.65 -0.02 1.00 
 Orange France Bouygues Telecom SFR SK Telecom 
 Lrts Mrts Krts RTS Lrts Mrts Krts RTS Lrts Mrts Krts RTS Lrts Mrts Krts RTS 
1998         0.18 0.67 0.08 0.93 0.31 0.50 0.09 0.90 
1999         0.08 0.73 0.15 0.97 0.11 0.72 0.14 0.97 
2000         0.11 0.66 0.19 0.96 0.14 0.78 0.03 0.95 
2001     0.30 0.16 0.52 0.98 0.21 0.51 0.18 0.91 0.20 0.76 0.00 0.97 
2002 0.06 0.76 0.19 1.02 0.23 0.47 0.29 0.99 0.18 0.64 0.13 0.95 0.20 0.79 -0.02 0.97 
2003 0.05 0.80 0.19 1.04 0.23 0.53 0.25 1.00 0.13 0.76 0.10 0.99 0.17 0.82 0.01 1.00 
2004 0.08 0.83 0.14 1.04 0.21 0.55 0.25 1.01 0.16 0.76 0.07 0.99 0.21 0.79 -0.02 0.98 
2005 0.03 0.92 0.12 1.07 0.16 0.64 0.23 1.04 0.12 0.83 0.08 1.03 0.22 0.81 -0.03 1.00 
2006 0.07 0.89 0.10 1.07 0.24 0.61 0.17 1.02 0.16 0.77 0.10 1.03 0.20 0.80 0.02 1.01 
2007 0.01 0.99 0.12 1.12 0.23 0.62 0.19 1.04 0.12 0.89 0.05 1.07 0.18 0.80 0.05 1.02 
Mean 0.05 0.87 0.14 1.06 0.23 0.51 0.27 1.01 0.15 0.72 0.11 0.98 0.21 0.72 0.03 0.96 
Lrts denotes labour input elasticity; Mrts denotes material input elasticity; and Krts denotes capital input elasticity.  
RTS is the overall scale elasticity (returns to scale).  
RTS = 1 indicates constant return to scale (CRS); RTS < 1 indicates decreasing returns to scale (DRS); and RTS > 
1 indicates increasing returns to scale (IRS). 
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Input elasticity (returns to scale) estimates from SFA (Continued) 
 KFT LG Telecom Sprint Nextel Verizon Wireless 
 Lrts Mrts Krts RTS Lrts Mrts Krts RTS Lrts Mrts Krts RTS Lrts Mrts Krts RTS 
1998 -0.09 0.94 0.33 1.19 -0.07 0.90 0.37 1.20 0.08 0.70 0.16 0.94 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.80 
1999 -0.12 1.10 0.21 1.19 -0.01 0.94 0.22 1.15 0.10 0.70 0.11 0.91 0.29 0.22 0.29 0.80 
2000 0.02 0.93 0.16 1.11 0.04 0.97 0.12 1.13 0.14 0.60 0.14 0.88 0.23 0.36 0.19 0.78 
2001 0.03 0.93 0.14 1.10 0.08 0.81 0.25 1.14 0.13 0.59 0.16 0.88 0.27 0.34 0.15 0.77 
2002 0.07 0.97 0.04 1.09 0.11 0.79 0.22 1.12 0.12 0.62 0.16 0.90 0.29 0.31 0.17 0.78 
2003 0.14 0.93 0.00 1.07 0.23 0.74 0.11 1.09 0.13 0.64 0.15 0.91 0.30 0.33 0.16 0.79 
2004 0.14 0.98 -0.03 1.09 0.12 0.91 0.11 1.14 0.14 0.65 0.14 0.93 0.32 0.28 0.17 0.78 
2005 0.17 0.95 -0.04 1.09 0.15 0.85 0.12 1.13 0.11 0.78 0.05 0.94 0.32 0.28 0.19 0.79 
2006 0.14 1.02 -0.04 1.11 0.11 0.92 0.12 1.15 0.09 0.92 -0.06 0.95 0.36 0.23 0.21 0.80 
2007 0.05 1.14 -0.04 1.15 0.06 0.98 0.14 1.18 0.09 0.91 -0.03 0.96 0.34 0.26 0.22 0.82 
Mean 0.05 0.99 0.07 1.12 0.08 0.88 0.18 1.14 0.12 0.69 0.10 0.92 0.30 0.29 0.20 0.79 
 Rogers wireless Telus (Mobility) Mean     
 Lrts Mrts Krts RTS Lrts Mrts Krts RTS Lrts Mrts Krts RTS     
1998 0.33 0.32 0.33 0.97     0.22 0.50 0.25 0.97     
1999 0.35 0.26 0.36 0.97 0.40 0.29 0.25 0.94 0.18 0.56 0.22 0.96     
2000 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.99 0.39 0.27 0.28 0.93 0.21 0.50 0.23 0.94     
2001 0.37 0.27 0.33 0.97 0.51 0.19 0.19 0.90 0.23 0.50 0.20 0.93     
2002 0.33 0.44 0.26 1.03 0.46 0.13 0.34 0.94 0.28 0.55 0.09 0.92     
2003 0.32 0.51 0.22 1.05 0.41 0.17 0.39 0.97 0.20 0.61 0.15 0.97     
2004 0.37 0.33 0.31 1.00 0.41 0.16 0.40 0.98 0.22 0.62 0.12 0.97     
2005 0.28 0.52 0.25 1.04 0.40 0.20 0.39 0.99 0.21 0.65 0.11 0.97     
2006 0.25 0.61 0.22 1.08 0.40 0.21 0.38 0.99 0.24 0.62 0.12 0.97     
2007 0.21 0.66 0.23 1.11 0.41 0.23 0.36 1.00 0.21 0.66 0.13 1.00     
Mean 0.30 0.42 0.29 1.01 0.42 0.21 0.33 0.96 0.23 0.58 0.15 0.96     
Lrts denotes labour input elasticity; Mrts denotes material input elasticity; and Krts denotes capital input elasticity.  
RTS is the overall scale elasticity (returns to scale).  
RTS = 1 indicates constant return to scale (CRS); RTS < 1 indicates decreasing returns to scale (DRS); and RTS > 
1 indicates increasing returns to scale (IRS). 
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Appendix C: Summary of firm SE and RTS over observation years 
 
  
Firm  SE RTS 
Total Revenue 
(2007, in bln US$s) 
China Mobile 0.85 0.78 48.3 
T-mobileGermany 0.95 0.88 47.7 
Verizon Wireles 0.86 0.79 43.9 
AT&T Mobility 1.00 0.98 42.7 
OrangeFT 0.98 0.93 39.9 
Sprint Nextel 0.98 0.92 34.7 
T-mobileEurope 0.99 0.95 28.4 
T-mobileUSA 0.99 0.94 19.3 
OrangeFrance 0.98 1.06 13.7 
SK Telecom 0.99 0.98 12.9 
China Unicom 0.91 0.84 12.6 
SFR 0.99 0.98 12.4 
VodafoneUK 1.00 0.97 10.7 
VodafoneGermany 0.99 0.96 10.5 
O2UK 0.99 0.98 10.1 
KTF 0.95 1.12 8.8 
OrangeUK 1.00 1.00 8.5 
Bouygues Teleco 1.00 1.01 6.5 
Rogers wireless 0.99 1.02 5.1 
LG Telecom 0.93 1.14 4.9 
O2Germany 0.98 0.98 4.9 
E-plus 0.98 1.00 4.1 
Telus (Mobility) 0.99 0.96 4.0 
Note: 2007 firm total operating revenues in the mobile service 
segment are used as a proxy of firm size.  
